



THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT (TRIA UPDATE)*

What happens when TRIA Expires on December 31, 2005

As has sometimes happened after an unexpectedly large natural disaster, insurance markets did not function well in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Although property and casualty insurers were able to pay insured claims, they sharply reduced the availability of terrorism insurance and raised premiums substantially. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), which lawmakers enacted in November 2002, can be seen as an effort to prevent the economic effects of an over-reaction to the heightened risk of losses from terrorism. The September 11 attacks revealed an increase in risk that may have reduced the value of many assets. However, the extent of the increase in risk--and of the reduction in asset values--was uncertain. That uncertainty enhanced the potential for insurers and property owners to misestimate the change in risk and asset values.

After September 11, analysts anticipated that insurers would need some time to recover financially from their losses, adjust their models of risk, and reenter the market. Consequently, TRIA created a temporary program designed to immediately boost the supply of terrorism insurance and bring down premiums. It also provided time for property owners and insurers to reassess risks. That program is scheduled to expire at the end of calendar year 2005.

TRIA's Provisions

TRIA requires all commercial property and casualty insurers to "make available" terrorism coverage to their policyholders and to disclose the premium charged for that coverage. The terrorism insurance cannot differ materially from the terms, amounts, and other coverage limitations that apply to losses from nonterrorist events. However, TRIA does not require property owners to purchase terrorism insurance.

In the event of a terrorist act as defined by TRIA, the federal government would reimburse (or reinsure) insurance companies for a significant portion of their terrorism claims. Reinsurance--in which one insurer sells some of its business and the associated income from premiums to another insurer--is a common practice in the private-sector property and casualty market worldwide. Reinsuring hazards with third parties allows primary insurers to diversify their risks and avoid ruinous losses from a single event. TRIA's reinsurance is limited in several respects, one being that only acts by foreign terrorists are covered. (For details about exclusions under TRIA, see [Box 1.](#))

Box 1.

Losses Excluded Under TRIA

One goal of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act was to restore the terrorism coverage that had been dropped after the attacks of September 11, 2001--not to expand the previous range of coverage. Consequently, coverage under TRIA is incomplete because gaps in coverage existed before September 11.

In general, TRIA covers neither acts of terrorism by domestic groups nor acts of war. (An exception exists for losses under workers' compensation insurance, because most states do not allow any

exclusions under that type of coverage.) Moreover, private insurers generally continue to exclude losses from nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological attacks from property and casualty coverage (but not workers' compensation), as they did before TRIA was enacted. The federal program does not mandate that losses from those sources be included, but it will cover them if the primary policy does. In addition, before federal payments would be made, the Secretary of the Treasury would have to certify that losses were related to international acts of terrorism and exceeded \$5 million. Federal payments would not cover punitive damage awards.

Up to now, financial losses in the United States from nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological attacks have been insignificant, and losses from acts of terrorism by domestic groups have been readily assumed by insurers. TRIA's certification process is untested, however, and some analysts worry about what would happen in cases in which the identity of a terrorist was hard to verify. For example, investigators have not yet identified the source of letters containing anthrax, which killed several people and sickened many more in 2001 when they were mailed to Members of Congress and others.

In the TRIA program, primary insurers would have to absorb some losses before federal reinsurance would begin to pay. Specifically, each insurer is responsible for a deductible, which in 2005 equals 15 percent of its premiums on commercial property and casualty policies during the previous year. For some of the largest insurers, that deductible amounts to hundreds of millions of dollars. Once an insurer had met the deductible, the federal government would pay 90 percent of the insurer's terrorism losses and the insurer would pay 10 percent--up to a total cap for the program of \$100 billion per year. If insured losses exceeded that limit, Congressional action would be required to provide additional assistance. However, according to TRIA, insurers that met their deductibles (and made their 10 percent copayments) would not be liable for any insured losses exceeding the \$100 billion cap.

The government charges insurers no premiums for its reinsurance. However, if it paid any claims under TRIA--which has not happened so far--the government would be required to recoup a certain amount of its losses by assessing surcharges on commercial insurance policies sold after the terrorism event occurred. That amount of losses, known as the aggregate industry retention level, is set at \$15 billion in 2005. To recoup it, the Treasury would have to assess annual surcharges of up to 3 percent of premiums on all commercial policyholders--even those that did not purchase terrorism insurance. The Treasury also has the discretion to recoup additional losses through continued assessments. Consequently, over the long term, TRIA's effect of the federal budget could be neutral--cash outlays could be offset by subsequent receipts from surcharges.

To encourage the development of private terrorism insurance, TRIA raises the industry retention level and insurers' individual deductibles each year. The industry retention level grew from \$10 billion in 2003 to \$12.5 billion in 2004 to the current level of \$15 billion. Likewise, deductibles equaled 7 percent of premiums in 2003 and 10 percent in 2004 and equal 15 percent now.

TRIA and the program it established are due to end on December 31, 2005. Before that (by June 30), the Secretary of the Treasury is required to complete a study of the effectiveness of the law. Proposals have been made to extend the TRIA program, in some cases with modifications. Examining the effects of the program to date may be useful to policymakers who face choices about TRIA's future.

Effects of TRIA on Insurance Markets

The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act added a subsidized federal source of reinsurance and gave the insurance industry time to improve its ability to forecast losses and to gradually reenter the market. For owners of high-risk properties, the law has succeeded in increasing the availability and lowering the price of coverage for property and casualty losses from terrorism. As a result, TRIA has led to an increase in the percentage of companies purchasing terrorism coverage.



Effects on the Supply of Terrorism Insurance

TRIA has served its purpose of immediately expanding the supply of terrorism insurance. It has also given private insurers time to raise financial capital and improve their models of risk, which have indirectly contributed to increasing the supply of coverage.

Mandatory Offer of Coverage. The requirement that insurance companies offer coverage and the federal government's assumption of much of the catastrophic risk for that coverage have made terrorism insurance much more available than it was in the months following the September 11 attacks. TRIA required the Secretary of the Treasury to determine by September 1, 2004, whether the law's "make available" requirement should be extended through the third and final year of the program. In June 2004, the Secretary opted to extend that requirement through 2005. Because commercial insurance contracts are renewed throughout the year, the Secretary made that determination in advance of the deadline to prevent disruption in insurance markets.

Unlike primary insurers, reinsurers in the private sector are not covered by TRIA. At current prices, most insurers are not buying private reinsurance to cover their potential deductibles and 10 percent copayments under TRIA. However, reinsurance for acts of terrorism not covered by the law (such as terrorism by domestic groups) and for certified workers' compensation is widely available and is being purchased.

Financial Condition of Insurers. Insurers' capacity to provide coverage depends on their net worth (assets minus liabilities) and the availability of reinsurance. The largest component of net worth is their accumulated stock of retained earnings.

The net worth of property and casualty insurers dropped after September 11. Insured losses from the attacks have been estimated at \$30 billion to \$35 billion. Insurers' total underwriting losses--the difference between their premium income and expenses--reached \$52.6 billion in 2001. With insufficient investment income in 2001 to offset those underwriting losses, the industry's net worth fell by \$27.8 billion that year.

Under TRIA, property and casualty insurers have replaced capital and are earning underwriting profits for the first time in nearly 20 years, in part because of relatively low catastrophic losses. Consequently, the net worth of the industry rose to \$370.4 billion on June 30, 2004, from \$285 billion at the end of 2002.

Modeling Insurance Losses. TRIA also provided time for the industry to improve its ability to predict losses from terrorism and thus to put a price tag on risk more accurately. Several competing models that predict the risk of losses from terrorism by zip code or by individual location are now available from EQECAT, Risk Management Solutions (RMS), and Applied Insurance Research Worldwide (AIR). The level of detail in the new models allows insurers to distinguish the higher risk faced by city centers from the lower risk faced by outlying urban areas. Each model contains a list of potential terrorist targets and produces estimates of the severity of losses associated with different types of attacks.

Although substantial progress has been made in modeling terrorism losses, the new models are not as reliable as those for natural catastrophes, which are based on more than 100 years of data rather than on two major events in the past 11 years (the September 11 attacks and the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center). Terrorism models are hampered not only by a lack of data but also by the absence of an established "theory" of terrorist attacks. For example, the RMS model assumes that most of the risk is concentrated in a few major cities and in a limited number of landmark properties with high visibility. In contrast, the EQECAT model assumes that terrorists might attack low-profile targets in outlying areas to demonstrate that no place is safe. Moreover, the EQECAT model assumes that terrorists will change their tactics when efforts are made to reduce risks at specific sites. Although opinions differ about the accuracy of the models, lack of consistency between models need not hinder development of a private market. The private sector has been able to insure against natural disasters despite varying estimates of losses from such events.

Notwithstanding concern by some actuaries that existing tools are not good enough to predict losses from terrorism--and thus to set prices for coverage--insurers use a calculated benchmark for setting premiums.

The Insurance Services Office (ISO), a company that provides data and analytic services to insurers, files advisory estimates of loss costs (expected annual losses over the long term) with insurance commissioners in each state. Once state commissioners approve an ISO advisory, any insurance company operating in that state can use the estimates as a basis for setting premiums without having to undertake the formal rate-filing process. In 2003, all 50 states approved ISO's estimates of loss costs.

ISO's estimates--which are based on a model for estimating terrorism losses developed by its subsidiary, AIR--are location-specific. On the basis of that model, ISO placed New York, Washington, D.C., Chicago, and San Francisco in the highest tier and recommended loss costs of \$0.10 per \$100 of property value. (Actual prices for insurance would be adjusted upward to also cover administrative costs, the cost of capital, and risk.) Cities in the highest tier, however, objected that such rates would hurt businesses. Subsequently, ISO lowered its estimate of maximum losses to \$0.03 per \$100 of property value in downtown city centers and to lesser amounts for properties on the outskirts of those cities. Tier 2 rates--covering Boston, Houston, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Seattle--were set at \$0.018 per \$100 of property value. Rates for tier 3--covering the rest of the country--were set at \$0.001 per \$100.

Although the probability of events such as terrorist attacks cannot be known, the maximum amount of losses can be estimated, because property values and replacement costs are known. Modelers agree that the insurance industry could face losses from a single event greater than those experienced on September 11. In particular, losses for workers' compensation policies, which cover all contingencies, could be far higher than the less than \$2 billion in claims that followed September 11. For example, the EQECAT model estimates a one-in-100 chance of losses of at least \$13.7 billion for workers' compensation insurers. The RMS model puts that one-in-100 chance of loss at \$3.8 billion. Those two models also assign very different losses to events with a more remote possibility of occurring and different probabilities to specific terrorist attacks.

Capital-Market Innovations. Although capital markets are currently absorbing some terrorism risk, the development of financial instruments for spreading that risk would probably be more rapid in the absence of TRIA. The reason is that private alternatives have difficulty competing with a free federal program. Because international capital markets are larger than insurance markets, they could potentially absorb the losses from a terrorist attack without significant disruption. Daily fluctuations in the overall value of traded capital assets worldwide can easily exceed the losses incurred on September 11.

In the absence of TRIA, catastrophe bonds--which fully or partly forgive the bond seller from making interest and principal payments in the event of specified catastrophes--might be used for terrorism losses, as they have been used to spread the risk of natural disasters. (For more information, see [Appendix B](#).) Two international catastrophe bonds have been issued that combine terrorism risk with other risks.

Effects on Prices for Terrorism Insurance


TRIA accelerated a previous trend of declining prices for terrorism insurance. Since the beginning of 2003, rates for that insurance have fallen by half. In the third quarter of 2004, the premium for terrorism coverage typically represented about 4 percent of the total premium for property insurance--down from more than 10 percent in the first quarter of 2003 (see [Figure 1](#)). That drop occurred as insurers' own deductibles under TRIA were rising, which would normally cause insurers to raise premiums. TRIA is probably not responsible for the entire drop in rates in 2003, because more capital was entering the insurance industry and insurers were learning more about pricing terrorism risks.



Figure 1.

Premium for Terrorism Coverage as a Percentage of the Premium for Property Insurance

(Percent)



Source: Congressional Budget Office based on survey data from insurance broker Marsh Inc.

Notes: The survey whose data are shown here covers Marsh clients, which tend to be drawn from the 5,000 largest firms. Thus, small firms may be underrepresented in the results.

The first quarter of 2003 was the first real opportunity for insurance companies to provide terrorism coverage under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, but the Treasury was still implementing the legislation. Marsh cautions that data for that quarter may not be comparable with later results.

The cost of terrorism insurance fell throughout the period shown in this figure, but so did the cost of property insurance. In the more-recent quarters, property insurance costs fell faster than terrorism insurance costs, causing the slight upward trend after the third quarter of 2003.

Despite TRIA, terrorism coverage remained costly in 2003, especially for high-risk properties. A survey by the Council of Insurance Agents and Brokers showed that in that year, terrorism coverage added 10 percent to the average property insurance premium for small and medium-size accounts and up to 20 percent for larger accounts. Landmark properties in major urban areas faced even higher additions. For example, one insurance broker reported that in Manhattan, terrorism risks could be priced at 100 percent of the rate for property insurance, compared with just 5 percent to 10 percent in other sections of New York City.


In 2004, the median cost of purchasing terrorism insurance ranged from \$53 to \$80 per \$1 million of insured value (or between 0.53 and 0.80 basis points). Although that cost dropped by more than 40 percent between the second and fourth quarters of 2003, it returned to higher levels in the first half of 2004 as companies purchased more-comprehensive coverage (see [Figure 2](#)). Because of the increasing

level of coverage, that rise in overall cost may have masked a continuing trend of falling rates. The overall cost of terrorism insurance came back down in the third quarter of 2004.

Figure 2.

Median Annual Premium for Terrorism Coverage

(Percentage of total insured value)



Source: Congressional Budget Office based on survey data from insurance broker Marsh Inc.

Notes: * = not available.

The survey whose data are shown here covers Marsh clients, which tend to be drawn from the 5,000 largest firms. Thus, small firms may be underrepresented in the results.

Premiums for both terrorism insurance and property insurance fell during the period shown in this figure; however, for most of the period, property insurance rates fell faster. As rates fell, firms purchased more-comprehensive terrorism coverage. That more-comprehensive coverage pushed up premiums measured as a percentage of total insured value.


Effects on Purchases of Terrorism Insurance

Purchases of insurance against terrorism-related losses were initially low under TRIA but have since increased sharply. After the cost of terrorism coverage fell substantially in 2003, the percentage of firms buying policies nearly doubled. A recent survey by an insurance broker shows that 44 percent of large companies bought terrorism coverage in the third quarter of 2004, compared with 26 percent in the third quarter of 2003 (see [Figure 3](#)). Another survey found that 57 percent of commercial property owners purchased terrorism insurance in the third quarter of 2004 versus 24 percent in early 2003. A majority of firms with terrorism coverage are now purchasing insurance for events not covered by TRIA, including acts of terrorism by domestic groups.

Figure 3.

Percentage of Companies Purchasing Terrorism Coverage

(Percent)



Source: Congressional Budget Office based on survey data from insurance broker Marsh Inc.

Notes: * = not available.

The survey whose data are shown here covers Marsh clients, which tend to be drawn from the 5,000 largest firms. Thus, small firms may be underrepresented in the results.

Rates of coverage vary by region. Among large companies, they tend to be highest in the Northeast and Midwest (over 50 percent for the past 12 months) and lowest in the West (34 percent), where risk is presumed to be lowest. Coverage also varies by financing source. For example, nearly all of the properties that are financed by commercial mortgage-backed securities have terrorism coverage (see [Box 2](#)). Moreover, effective rates of coverage may be higher than surveys indicate because the surveys do not reflect terrorism insurance that is implicitly included in certain policies--such as workers' compensation policies and those for losses from fires--because of state regulations (see [Box 3](#)).

Box 2.

Terrorism Insurance for Commercial Mortgages

The demand for insurance coverage is high in the market for commercial mortgages because of requirements imposed by third parties, especially credit-rating agencies. For example, Moody's generally requires terrorism coverage in order for a commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS)--which groups the underlying cash flows from mortgages on various properties into a bond--to receive the agency's highest rating, Aaa.⁽¹⁾ Requirements also vary depending on the investor and the servicer. (Servicers act as intermediaries, collecting principal and interest payments from borrowers and handling defaults.) According to an industry survey, nearly all of the balances being serviced for CMBSs--the largest segment of the commercial/multifamily mortgage market--were required to have terrorism insurance in place, whereas just 28 percent of the balances held as whole loans by commercial banks and savings and loan institutions required terrorism insurance.⁽²⁾ In one recent deal, involving a \$1.3 billion CMBS composed of 106 loans and 120 properties (including a number of retail shopping malls across the country), 99.7 percent of the balance underlying the CMBS had terrorism insurance in place.⁽³⁾

An industry survey of \$656 billion in commercial/multifamily loans found that investors or servicers required terrorism insurance on \$616 billion, or about 94 percent, of that debt.⁽⁴⁾ Terrorism insurance was actually in place for about \$548 billion, or 84 percent.⁽⁵⁾ Such widespread terrorism coverage for commercial mortgages suggests that there is a substantial private-sector supply of terrorism insurance.

1. Aaa bonds are supposed to have a default rate of about one in 10,000, or 0.01 percent, over 10 years. Daniel B. Rubock, *CMBS: Moody's Approach to Terrorism Insurance After the Federal Backstop*, Structured Finance Special Report (New York: Moody's Investors Service, January 6, 2003).
2. Mortgage Bankers Association, "More Than \$400 Billion of Commercial/Multifamily Debt at Risk for Loss of Terrorism Risk Insurance Without Extension of TRIA 'Make-Available' Provision" (press release, Washington, D.C., June 2, 2004), available at www.mortgagebankers.org/news/.
3. Standard & Poor's, "Presale: J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Corp., Series 2004-CIBC8," *Ratings Direct*, March 16, 2004.
4. Mortgage Bankers Association, "More Than \$400 Billion of Commercial/Multifamily Debt at Risk." The survey sampled about 123,000 loans, with an average size of \$5.3 million, out of the total commercial/multifamily mortgage market of about \$2 trillion. Commercial banks and savings and loans were minimally represented in the survey and thus do not greatly affect the overall results.
5. When coverage is required but not in place, servicers seldom resort to litigation to require it. Most servicers prefer to work with borrowers to obtain coverage, although some will purchase it themselves and then bill borrowers for the cost.

Box 3.

State Regulations That Affect Terrorism Insurance

Various state regulations limit insurers' ability to restrict coverage for losses from terrorist attacks and to set risk-adjusted rates for some types of insurance. If the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) expired



after 2005, those restrictions could decrease the supply of private-sector terrorism insurance in the long run by discouraging insurers from issuing it.

State regulations dealing with coverage have implications both for the current marketplace and for the future if TRIA expired. For example, even before that law was enacted, five states--New York, California, Florida, Georgia, and Texas--required terrorism coverage to be included in commercial property and casualty insurance. Unless changed at the state level, those requirements would continue to apply after TRIA's expiration. Moreover, even today, companies that do not purchase terrorism coverage could find some of their terrorism-related claims covered by other types of insurance. In 23 states (including California, New York, and Illinois), property insurance covers losses from fires regardless of the cause of the fire.⁽¹⁾ Moreover, 49 states require workers' compensation policies to cover occupational injuries regardless of their cause. (Pennsylvania has an exception for war-related losses.) Thus, state regulations result in terrorism coverage for some claims whether or not a federal requirement exists.

State regulations also limit insurers' ability to set prices for their exposure to terrorism risk in the workers' compensation market. The portion of workers' compensation premiums that reflects terrorism generally does not vary geographically within a state or by the amount of risk.⁽²⁾ Coverage is virtually mandatory and is guaranteed through state workers' compensation funds or assigned risk mechanisms.⁽³⁾ If many workers are injured in a single event, losses can be high. Thus, concentrated risks--which can threaten insurers' solvency--generally cannot be priced in the primary workers' compensation market, even though a reinsurer would most likely take that risk into consideration by charging higher premiums for reinsurance. Those regulations limit the private supply of workers' compensation insurance.

1. General Accounting Office, *Terrorism Insurance: Implementation of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002*, GAO-04-307 (April 2004), p. 26.
2. Towers Perrin, *Workers' Compensation Terrorism Reinsurance Pool Feasibility Study* (April 14, 2004), available at www.towersperrin.com/tillinghast/publications/reports/WC_Terr_Pool/WC_Terr_Pool_Study.pdf.
3. Employers that are considered high-risk may have problems obtaining workers' compensation insurance in the private market. How such cases are handled varies from state to state. Some states have their own workers' compensation funds, which accept all risks rejected by private insurers. Other states rely on assigned risk plans and allocate high-risk employers to insurers on the basis of an insurer's market share.

As for companies that do not buy terrorism coverage, surveys suggest that most of them do not consider themselves potential terrorist targets. (Coverage is higher in cities thought to be at greatest risk--such as New York, Washington, Chicago, and San Francisco--than in other areas despite higher premiums in those cities.) Firms might choose to forgo coverage for other reasons as well. Surveys suggest that pricing and a company's ability to tolerate some risk are factors in the decision not to purchase terrorism coverage. Moreover, to the extent that firms' shareholders hold diversified portfolios, they may place little value on losses to specific companies. If some firms have rationally decided that the costs of buying terrorism coverage outweigh the benefits, then full coverage may not be a desirable policy goal (see [Box 4](#)).

Box 4.

Does Low Coverage Signal a Market Failure?

Even though the percentage of companies purchasing terrorism insurance has been rising, roughly one in two large firms still lacks such insurance. That low rate of coverage most likely results from a rational weighing of the costs and benefits of purchasing insurance rather than from some failure in the market. Lack of available coverage and imperfect information could be signs of a market failure; however, those factors do not appear to explain the pattern of purchases and prices in the market for terrorism insurance.

The existing evidence suggests that coverage is available. In particular, high coverage rates in the market for commercial mortgage-backed securities (as described in [Box 2](#)) support the belief that the supply is ample in the primary market. Moreover, competition should force insurers to pass the subsidies provided by the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act through to policyholders, so current premiums for terrorism coverage should be below market rates. Insurance companies and brokers might be keeping a small portion of the subsidy--an outcome that is more likely if recent allegations of bid-rigging by insurers and brokers are substantiated.⁽¹⁾

Property owners appear to be making rational decisions about terrorism coverage on the basis of publicly available information. (The government may have better information about risk that remains classified.) Higher coverage in areas at greater risk supports that view. However, if purchases are being held down by the expectation that the federal government would aid uninsured parties after a terrorist attack or by underestimates of risk, then coverage may be too low.

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1. Allegations of bid-rigging by insurers and by the largest insurance broker, Marsh & McLennan, suggest that commercial insurance customers in general may not have fully benefited from competition in the market. See Monica Langley and Theo Francis, "Insurers Reel from Spitzer's Strike," *Wall Street Journal*, October 18, 2004, p. 1.

Economic Effects and the Cost of TRIA

TRIA was explicitly designed to minimize the short-term economic effects of the risk of terrorism, at some expected cost to taxpayers. Whether it has succeeded in doing so is difficult to determine. Although no claims have been filed under TRIA, administering the program is expected to cost taxpayers \$14 million over the 2003-2005 period. Moreover, the program exposes taxpayers to tens of billions of dollars in possible liabilities. In addition, the TRIA program may be hurting the economy in the longer term by delaying the private sector's adjustment to a continuing risk of terrorism.

Short-Term Macroeconomic Effects

TRIA was created as a temporary program to avoid a contraction of economic activity. In particular, by increasing the availability and lowering the price of terrorism insurance, the program was intended to keep commercial construction projects moving forward. Assessing the macroeconomic effects of TRIA is difficult because it is hard to know how the economy would have performed in the absence of the law. For example, the extent to which commercial construction would have declined because builders could not obtain financing is uncertain. Surveys indicate that in the six months following September 11, banks did not significantly tighten their commercial-lending requirements in response to the shortage of terrorism



insurance, but there is little other evidence from before TRIA was enacted. (In part, commercial-lending requirements may have stayed the same because firms have alternative ways of spreading risk besides insurance; see [Box 5](#).)

Box 5.

Diversification as an Alternative to Insurance

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, there was little systemic evidence that problems in the insurance market had spilled over to affect financing of construction projects. One explanation is that lenders financing such projects can reduce their risk through loan diversification as well as insurance.⁽¹⁾ Moreover, real estate investment trusts, which are essentially mutual funds for real estate holdings, and commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBSs), which group the underlying cash flows from mortgages on various properties into bonds, allow lenders to shed most of their credit risk--and investors to diversify their holdings--at low cost.

If terrorism insurance is in short supply, meeting the criteria that credit-rating agencies set for investment-grade CMBSs may affect how properties are combined into securities. In particular, single-property CMBSs will be less attractive (in the absence of federal reinsurance) because large properties--particularly landmark properties--are thought to be at greater risk from terrorists than other properties are. In addition, Moody's is more likely to rate a security lower if a large loan represents more than 20 percent of that security, thus creating the potential for a concentrated loss from a terrorist act. When terrorism insurance is lacking, adjustments to the capital structure of a CMBS might be required to maintain a high credit rating. For example, the developers might be required to put more equity into the properties.

In the wake of September 11, two of the three rating agencies, Moody's and Fitch Ratings, did downgrade some CMBSs because of a lack of terrorism coverage.⁽²⁾ The third, Standard & Poor's, did not downgrade any CMBSs because of a lack of coverage,⁽³⁾ but it disclosed whether terrorism coverage was in place for the properties that made up a security.⁽³⁾

1. See Kent Smetters, "Insuring Against Terrorism: The Policy Challenge" (paper prepared for the January 8-9, 2004, Conference of the Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services, February 2, 2004, draft), available at <http://irm.Wharton.upenn.edu/WP-Insuring-Smetters.pdf>.
2. Moody's did not take any rating actions on CMBSs rated below Aa because, below that level, the risk from uninsured terrorism losses was seen as being heavily outweighed by the standard risks that such mortgages entail. Daniel B. Rubock, *CMBS: Moody's Approach to Terrorism Insurance After the Federal Backstop*, Structured Finance Special Report (New York: Moody's Investors Service, January 6, 2003).
3. Standard & Poor's believed that TRIA's "make available" provision mandated insurers to cover terrorism risk and thus worsened their risk profile. The agency also believed that insurers did not know how to price terrorism insurance and that risk models could lull them into a "false sense of complacency." See Standard & Poor's, "Little Ratings Cheer for Insurers in New Terrorism Risk Legislation," *Ratings Direct*, November 26, 2002.

After TRIA's enactment, some recovery in retail construction occurred. But the law appears to have had little measurable effect on office construction, employment in the construction industry, or the volume of commercial construction loans made by large commercial banks. Various factors complicate that assessment, however: the effects of the 2001 recession and of the investment bubble of the late 1990s could be masking positive macroeconomic effects of TRIA.



Cost to Taxpayers

As of December 1, 2004, no claims have been incurred under TRIA, but that does not mean that the program has no cost. Indeed, the cost--in terms of risk and uncertainty--of having the federal government provide terrorism reinsurance is approximately the same as the cost of having the private sector provide it. With a federal program, however, that cost is shifted from shareholders of insurance companies and owners of commercial properties to taxpayers. The shift in cost would occur even if surcharges ultimately offset all cash outlays under TRIA.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the expected value of federal outlays from TRIA to be \$630 million over the 2005-2015 period and the value of governmental receipts from surcharges to be \$320 million over the same period. (Expected-value estimates reflect CBO's expectation of payments during the period based on the probabilities of various outcomes, from losses of zero up to very large amounts.) The outlay estimate does not include any charge for the risk and uncertainty borne by taxpayers. Thus, it is less than the likely market price for such reinsurance.

Unlike CBO's baseline, the President's budget (which is prepared by the Office of Management and Budget) does not report expected losses from insurance claims for the TRIA program. Because of the uncertainty surrounding losses from and frequency of future terrorist attacks, the President's budget shows only the administrative costs of the program.

Long-Term Effects

An increase in risk from terrorism is in some senses analogous to an increase in risk from natural disasters: it raises the costs and lowers the value of some types of activities in high-risk areas. By analogy, TRIA is equivalent to a policy of subsidizing property and casualty insurance in an area that appears to have an especially high risk of natural disasters. If the increase in risk is only temporary or akin to a once-in-100-year phenomenon, then a federal program to provide low-cost insurance could be justified as a means of avoiding an expensive and unnecessary effort to reduce losses.

If the increase in risk is long-lived, however, such a federal program could be costly to the economy because it could further delay owners of assets from making adjustments to mitigate their risk and reduce potential losses. Since July 2004, when the 9/11 Commission published its report, a consensus appears to have emerged that the current increased risk of terrorism is likely to continue for years. With a sustained change in the risk of loss, spreading that risk through insurance is only part of an economically efficient response. Taking steps to mitigate risk--such as moving operations to safer locations, installing better security systems, establishing disaster-recovery procedures, and setting up systems to protect computerized information--is also important.

There is relatively little evidence that firms have been making additional investments since September 11 to improve their security and avoid losses. One possible reason is that firms are only gradually and reluctantly concluding that the terrorism threat will persist. Other reasons may be that some initial measures that firms are taking (such as decentralizing certain operations) are not easily tracked or that firms needed time to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of different measures. But a possible explanation is that subsidized insurance is shielding companies from facing the costs of their exposure to risk. (Because any postevent surcharges levied under TRIA would be uniformly assessed on all commercial policyholders, rather than only on holders of terrorism coverage, they do not provide an incentive for firms to reduce losses.)

If the federal government continued to subsidize terrorism insurance, it would probably contribute to deferring the private-sector's long-term adjustment to the increase in risk. Less adjustment means that losses from future attacks would be greater than would otherwise be the case. Experience with other federally subsidized insurance programs suggests that their economic effects can be substantial. For example, federal flood insurance encourages development in areas prone to flooding and discourages



both relocation and measures to prevent floods. In that way, federal programs can increase losses from hazards.

The extent to which TRIA may actually be reducing efforts to mitigate risk is unknown. However, some evidence suggests that the law is having an effect in another area: slowing the development of alternative approaches to spreading risk, such as mutual reinsurance pools and catastrophe bonds (see [Box 6](#) and [Appendix B](#)).

Box 6.

Mutual Reinsurance Pools

Reinsurance pools allow insurers to share their risks with other members of the pool. Typically, an insurer is financially responsible for some initial level of losses, but the entire pool covers some or all of the losses above that level. In return for sharing losses, the other members of the pool receive a portion of the insurer's premiums. Thus, pools provide an alternative to reinsurance. The major difference is that pool members may be hit with surcharges after an event that exhausts the pool's resources.

The United Kingdom and other nations have formed government-backed mutual reinsurance pools for terrorism risk (see [Appendix A](#)). However, U.S. insurers could also form such pools without government backing.⁽¹⁾ Although reinsurance pools would not create new capital in the insurance industry, they would expand the industry's ability to write coverage and absorb losses by increasing the diversification of risk. Mutual reinsurance pools might be particularly well suited to the risk of terrorism because they typically set premiums on the basis of relative risk and rely on assessing surcharges on pool members after the fact to cover shortfalls. Consequently, estimates of the level of terrorism risk would not be needed.

In early 2004, a group of 14 insurers (including the Hartford Financial Services Group and American International Group) considered forming a mutual reinsurance pool to cover workers' compensation losses from terrorist acts, including nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological attacks.⁽²⁾ Estimates predicted that the pool could have reduced most members' risk by more than 50 percent. (Pooling risk tightens the probability distribution of losses and thus reduces financial risk; it does not change expected losses.) Projections also showed that a mutual reinsurance pool for workers' compensation could handle losses from an event similar in size to the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center but not worst-case scenarios involving biological, chemical, or nuclear contamination.⁽³⁾

The main reason that insurers did not proceed with the mutual reinsurance pool was fear that, even with the pool, a catastrophic act of terrorism could exhaust the capital backing workers' compensation insurance. Uncertainty about the future of the federal terrorism reinsurance program was another factor. However, if that program expires as scheduled, a mutual reinsurance pool to spread the terrorism risk facing workers' compensation insurance may look more attractive to insurers.

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1. Mutual insurance pools are used in the United States in surety finance. The pools are an alternative to purchasing surety bonds, which insurers sell to oil and gas companies to meet their financial-assurance requirements for reclamation after oil and gas activities. Two states have formed bond pools that mutualize participants' risk, and the mining industry has expressed interest in expanding the use of bond pools. See Congressional Budget Office, [Bonding for Reclaiming Federal Lands](#) (October 2003).
 2. Towers Perrin, *Workers' Compensation Terrorism Reinsurance Pool Feasibility Study* (April 14, 2004), available at



www.towersperrin.com/tillinghast/publications/reports/WC_Terr_Pool/WC_Terr_Pool_Study.pdf.

3. Workers' compensation claims from the September 11 attacks are estimated to total about \$1.8 billion. Payouts from the federal September 11th Victim Compensation Fund reduced those claims by about \$200 million. Personal communication to the Congressional Budget Office by Robert Hartwig, Insurance Information Institute, July 22, 2004.

Policy Implications

Three options for the future of the TRIA program have been under discussion in the Congress. One is to allow the program to expire at the end of calendar year 2005, as scheduled under current law. A second option is to extend it as is. For example, H.R. 4772, which was introduced in the House on July 7, 2004, would have extended the TRIA program in its current form and left individual insurers' deductibles and the industry retention level unchanged. A third option is to modify TRIA. For example, H.R. 4634, which was reported by the House Committee on Financial Services on September 29, 2004, would have continued the program through 2007, raised individual insurers' deductibles from 15 percent this year to 20 percent in 2007, increased the industry retention level from \$15 billion now to \$20 billion in 2007, and extended reinsurance coverage to providers of group life insurance. CBO estimated that on an expected-value basis, that legislation would increase outlays by \$1.3 billion and receipts by \$480 million over the 2005-2014 period (for more details of that estimate, see [Box 7](#)).

Box 7.

CBO's Estimate of the Costs of the Terrorism Insurance Backstop Extension Act of 2004

Extending the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) under the terms envisioned by the Terrorism Insurance Backstop Extension Act of 2004 (H.R. 4634) would expose federal taxpayers to tens of billions of dollars in liabilities for two more years. For any single year, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has no basis for estimating the likelihood of terrorist attacks or the amount of insured damage they might cause. Instead, its estimate of the cost of enacting H.R. 4634 reflects how much, on average, the government could be expected to pay insurers.⁽¹⁾

On the basis of discussions with insurers and information provided by the insurance industry, CBO estimates that the expected average annual loss subject to coverage under TRIA would be about \$1.5 billion, including \$100 million from the inclusion of group life insurance policies. That estimate assumes that in most years, terrorist attacks would cost less than \$1.5 billion. There is a significant assumed probability--approaching 50 percent--that no terrorist attacks that would be covered by TRIA would occur in a given year. Further, CBO assumes for that estimate that attacks similar in scale to the losses sustained on September 11, 2001, are likely to occur very rarely.

On an expected-value basis, CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 4634 would increase direct spending by about \$1.1 billion over the 2005-2009 period and by \$1.3 billion over 10 years. The Treasury Department would recoup some or all of those costs through surcharges, which would increase governmental receipts by about \$70 million through 2009 and \$480 million over 10 years. Because surcharges can be imposed for many years, CBO expects that the increase in spending would eventually be offset to a greater extent than that.

The Treasury would need to charge insurers premiums of almost \$700 million in both calendar years 2006 and 2007 just to offset the government's average annual loss from providing the reinsurance, CBO estimates. However, those premiums would not compensate taxpayers for the risk they were bearing.



Although this estimate reflects CBO's best judgment on the basis of available information, actual costs could vary greatly from the estimate.

1. Congressional Budget Office, [Cost Estimate for H.R. 4634, Terrorism Insurance Backstop Extension Act of 2004](#) (November 19, 2004).

The Administration has not announced a policy recommendation for the TRIA program. It is waiting for the Treasury to complete an assessment of the law and of the industry's likely capacity to offer terrorism insurance in the absence of federal backing. That assessment, which was mandated by TRIA, is due to be delivered to the Congress by June 30. As part of the analysis, the Treasury is conducting comprehensive surveys of insurers, reinsurers, and policyholders, which will examine the effects of changes in TRIA's insurer deductibles in successive years of the program. Those surveys are intended to provide a broader and more dynamic view of the marketplace than existing surveys by private firms do. The Treasury's assessment could reveal whether there is evidence of long-term failures in the insurance market that are not apparent from current information.

Pros and Cons of Letting TRIA Expire

Two significant changes have occurred in the years since TRIA was enacted that have implications for future policy. First, there is a growing perception that the risk of terrorism is likely to remain high. That development suggests that property owners and businesses need to take measures to reduce their exposure to that risk. They would have a stronger incentive to take such measures if the insurance subsidies conveyed through TRIA were reduced or eliminated. Second, the underwriting capacity of the insurance industry has recovered greatly. That change implies that private insurers can play a bigger role in providing terrorism coverage.

If TRIA expired as planned, premiums for terrorism insurance would be likely to rise, perhaps substantially. Not only would the end of federal subsidies drive up rates in the private sector, but the uncertainty associated with the risk of terrorism could lead insurers to charge higher premiums than they would if they had more-precise estimates of the probability, frequency, and size of possible losses, according to some analysts. However, the increase in premiums would encourage insurers and owners of assets to adjust to the higher level of terrorism risk. That adjustment, which would include more mitigation efforts, should reduce expected losses from terrorist attacks.

In the absence of federal reinsurance, insurers would be looking to use the private-sector reinsurance market to shed some of their terrorism risk and thereby limit their risk of catastrophic losses and insolvency. Reinsurers covered about 60 percent to 80 percent of the losses from the September 11 attacks, according to one estimate. In 2004, the capacity of the private terrorism reinsurance market remained low--between \$4 billion and \$6 billion, by industry estimates. In the face of higher premiums, however, mutual reinsurance pools might be a feasible source of increased coverage, especially for workers' compensation (see [Box 6](#)).

The economic effects of letting TRIA expire are unclear. But the economy is stronger now than it was in 2001 and 2002 and therefore is better able to handle an increase in costs for terrorism insurance. A study sponsored by the insurance industry concluded that failing to extend TRIA would have adverse effects on economic growth and employment, even if another terrorist attack did not occur. The study predicted that economic growth would be slowed because higher premiums for property insurance (and a resulting decrease in property values) would raise operating costs for businesses and because higher premiums for workers' compensation would increase labor costs. However, the study's results depend heavily on its particular assumptions; adverse effects would be smaller under a more plausible set of assumptions (see [Box 8](#)). The study also does not take into account TRIA's cost to taxpayers and its potentially adverse



impact on the economy's long-term adjustment to a higher level of terrorism risk.

Box 8.

Estimated Economic Effects of TRIA's Expiration

A recent study estimated that expiration of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) would result in a doubling of premiums for terrorism coverage, which would increase businesses' operating costs. The study also concluded that labor costs would rise to the extent that rates for workers' compensation insurance increased. Consequently, it said, economic growth would suffer: in 2008, for example, gross domestic product could be 0.4 percent lower, household net worth 0.9 percent lower, and the number of jobs 0.2 percent lower than would otherwise be the case, even in the absence of another major terrorist attack.⁽¹⁾ Those findings, however, appear to be on the high side of a plausible range.

The study's results hinge on assumptions about the extent to which premiums would increase and about businesses' response to those increases. First, on the basis of prices prevailing in 2002, the study assumes that the average premium for terrorism coverage would double once TRIA expired. But in 2002, the insurance industry was still in the early stages of adjusting to the shock of September 11. Today, it is better positioned to bear and price terrorism risk, which suggests that the premium increases would be smaller than assumed. Second, the model used in the study--which comes from the forecasting firm Macroeconomic Advisers--assumes that 100 percent of companies would have insurance coverage both before and after the assumed doubling of premiums. However, about 50 percent of companies have terrorism coverage today. Thus, far fewer firms would be affected by the higher prices than assumed. In addition, the higher prices would motivate more businesses to self-insure, which presumably costs less than purchasing coverage.

The study's assumption about monetary policy may magnify the short-term impact on economic activity. The study assumes that the Federal Reserve would not relax monetary policy in the face of weaker aggregate demand. But adopting an accommodative monetary policy could offset the aggregate economic effects in the short run.

The study also assumes that businesses would pay for the entire increase in premiums for workers' compensation. Macroeconomic Advisers' standard model, which is used in the study, generally assumes that part of similar employment costs are immediately shifted to workers, but that assumption was not used in this estimate. Moreover, the model implies that ultimately, all of the costs would be shifted to labor, so any negative effects on employment would most likely be temporary as well as overstated. Further, if firms could locate to less risky areas, higher operating costs might not be permanent.

The study also potentially magnifies the short-term effects of a higher cost of capital by assuming that the stock of nonresidential structures adjusts at a faster rate than is incorporated in Macroeconomic Advisers' standard model.⁽²⁾ Without that alternative assumption, the short-term negative effect on the economy would be smaller than projected.

Moreover, questions remain about the degree to which higher prices for insurance would reduce investment in nonresidential structures. Investment in so-called trophy (or landmark) properties would be likely to decline. But to the extent that smaller structures--with smaller risk and hence lower costs of terrorism insurance--could substitute for trophy properties, then investment would decline by less than the model suggests.



1. The authors also estimated negative economic effects for 2006 and 2007. R. Glenn Hubbard and Bruce Deal, *The Economic Effects of Federal Participation in Terrorism Risk* (study prepared by Analysis Group Inc. for the insurance industry, September 14, 2004), available at www.iii.org/media/lateststud/TRIA/. The study was funded by the American Insurance Association, the Financial Services Roundtable, the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, the National Council of Compensation Insurance, the Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, and the Reinsurance Association of America.
2. The macroeconomic estimates were generated by Macroeconomic Advisers' model using the assumptions that Hubbard and Deal made about the effect of TRIA's expiration on pricing and coverage. However, for that analysis, Macroeconomic Advisers shortened the lag in its standard equation for nonresidential structures because it believed that the long lag in the standard model did not adequately capture the response of the demand for nonresidential structures to higher insurance costs.

More fundamentally, letting TRIA expire would not increase the expected cost of terrorism to the economy but rather would change who bore it. Only if the government can bear terrorism risk at a lower cost than private firms and insurers will costs rise with the expiration of TRIA. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the government can bear terrorism risk more efficiently than others can. Currently, the cost of terrorism risk is being shared by taxpayers and by private parties--insurers and the owners of assets. If TRIA expired as scheduled, more of the cost would be borne by private firms and insurers. (Because uninsured losses can be deducted from corporate income taxes, taxpayers will always bear some of the losses.)

A disadvantage of letting TRIA expire is that doing so risks a market disruption after an unexpectedly large event, as has been the pattern for natural catastrophes. In particular, reinsurance premiums would be likely to spike after a terrorist attack, and the availability of insurance and reinsurance would drop. How long that disruption would last is uncertain. But in the aftermath of catastrophic events that deplete capital, high prices and reduced availability of insurance can persist, in part because of adjustment costs and uncertainty.

Reinsurers would also probably continue to exclude losses related to nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks from their coverage. That exclusion would be important mainly for the workers' compensation market, since primary insurers for that type of policy must cover losses from all causes. Potentially, insurers would be unable to diversify that catastrophic risk, at least in the near term, so rates for workers' compensation policies could rise substantially. Thus, TRIA's expiration would be likely to create transitional problems in the workers' compensation market.

Another disadvantage of letting TRIA expire is that with higher prices, the prevalence of insurance coverage would probably decline. Thus, lawmakers might find themselves providing more supplemental disaster assistance for uninsured losses following a major attack. In the case of September 11, federal assistance to businesses adversely affected by the attacks exceeded \$6 billion, out of total federal aid of more than \$30 billion in response to the attacks (see [Appendix C](#)). Of the \$6 billion for businesses, a relatively small amount--less than \$1 billion--was targeted specifically to firms that lacked coverage for business-interruption and property losses.



Pros and Cons of Modifying TRIA

If the TRIA program was extended rather than allowed to expire, the government could take steps to reduce the adverse effects that the program's financial backstop has on mitigation activities. Charging premiums for federal reinsurance would help encourage the private sector to adjust to the higher level of risk. When TRIA was proposed, its supporters argued against premiums on the grounds that not charging them would have only small effects in the short run and would avoid the need to create a federal entity to set premiums. However, if the primary goal now is to prompt the economy to adjust to a continuing threat of terrorism, that goal could be accomplished by setting premiums as close as possible to expected losses. Alternatively, to ensure that private insurers and reinsurers had room to compete with the government, policymakers could set premiums higher than expected losses (in other words, add "risk loads"). In addition, gradually raising the deductibles and coinsurance percentages that insurers pay for losses would help by slowly removing the government from the market.

On the downside, such changes would mostly likely cause the amount of terrorism coverage to decline. In addition, setting actuarially fair premiums is difficult for government agencies.

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